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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RYANN DANELL CAMPERUD,
Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 43575 & 43775
Ada County Case No.
CR-2015-2656

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Camperud failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion,
either by denying her request to continue sentencing a third time so that she could
complete the mental health evaluation for which she had previously failed to appear, or
by imposing concurrent unified sentences of three years, with one and one-half years
fixed, upon her guilty pleas to three counts of felony issuing a check without funds?

Camperud Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
In May 2015, the state charged Camperud with grand theft, misappropriation of
personal identifying information, and four counts of felony issuing a check without funds.
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(R., pp.33-35.) In July 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, Camperud pled guilty to
three counts of felony issuing a check without funds, and the state dismissed the
remaining charges and agreed to recommend an aggregate sentence of nine years,
with three years fixed.

(R., p.47; Tr., p.1, Ls.13-19.)

The district court ordered

substance abuse and mental health evaluations and set sentencing for August 27,
2015. (R., p.47; Tr., p.13, Ls.10-14.)
Camperud failed to appear for her evaluations at Family Services and
rescheduled her presentence interview twice, after showing up late and unprepared on
the first date and cancelling approximately 20 minutes before the interview on the
second date. (PSI, p.18. 1) When she finally did appear for her presentence interview
on August 6, 2015, Camperud had still not completed her questionnaire and appeared
to be “under the influence during her interview.” (PSI, p.18.)
On August 27, 2015, Camperud appeared in court for sentencing and requested
a continuance, which the district court granted.

(R., p.57.)

At the next scheduled

sentencing hearing, Camperud appeared and again requested a continuance.

(R.,

p.58.) The state objected to another continuance and requested that the district court
revoke Camperud’s bond, advising it believed Camperud was “delaying this process.”
(R., p.58.) The court declined to revoke Camperud’s bond and continued sentencing a
second time, but advised Camperud that sentencing would go forward on the next
scheduled date. (R., p.58.) On September 10, 2015, Camperud appeared in court and
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Camperud
43575 psi.pdf.”
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requested that sentencing be continued a third time because she had still failed to
complete her substance abuse and mental health evaluations. (R., p.59; Tr., p.21, L.22
– p.22, L.6.) The district court denied Camperud’s request for a third continuance,
noting that Camperud had been uncooperative with the presentence process, failed to
appear for her evaluations, and failed to reschedule the evaluations in a timely manner.
(R., p.59; Tr., p.23, L.16 – p.24, L.16.)

The court also concluded that there was

sufficient information with respect to Camperud’s mental health issues contained in the
presentence materials, which included information from a prior mental health evaluation.
(Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.23; PSI, p.278.) The district court imposed concurrent unified
sentences of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, for the three counts of
felony issuing a check without funds. (R., pp.61-63.) Camperud filed a notice of appeal
timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.69-71.)
Camperud asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
request to continue sentencing a third time so that she could complete the mental health
evaluation for which she had previously failed to appear, in light of her claim that her
“history and the context of the instant offenses reveals a pattern of escalating mental
health issues.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.)
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 706, 864 P.2d 149, 152
(1993). When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the inquiry involves (1)
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its
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decision by an exercise of reason. Id.; Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co.,
119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
Pursuant to I.C.R. 32(d), “the decision as to whether to order a psychological
evaluation is to be made by the sentencing judge.” A psychological evaluation is not
required in every case where the defendant claims some mental illness or disability.
State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822, 229 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Ct. App. 2010). Rather,
the decision of whether to obtain a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing
court's discretion. Id. A district court's election to not order a psychological evaluation
will be upheld on appeal if the record can support a finding that there was no reason to
believe the defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing or if
the information already before the court adequately met the requirements of section I.C.
§ 19–2522(3). Id.
In this case, the district court provided Camperud with the opportunity to
participate in a mental health evaluation, but Camperud failed to appear for her
evaluation appointment and failed to reschedule her appointment in a timely manner,
although she had sufficient time to do so. (PSI, p.18; Tr., p.23, Ls.19-25; p.24, Ls.1316.) She was also largely uncooperative with the presentence interview process and
failed to sign a “Release of Information” form so that the presentence investigator could
obtain Camperud’s mental health records. (PSI, pp.14, 18.) The court had already
continued the sentencing hearing twice – the second time over the state’s objection – by
the time Camperud finally decided to reschedule her evaluation. (R., pp.57-59.) When
Camperud requested a third continuance so that she could complete the untimely
evaluation, the district court noted that the presentence materials already contained
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information regarding Camperud’s mental health issues, and asked whether a new
evaluation would provide any information that had not already been addressed. (Tr.,
p.25, Ls.14-17.)

Camperud’s counsel did not indicate that any new or different

information would be obtained, but merely stated that an update “might be helpful.” (Tr.,
p.25, Ls.18-22.) Likewise, in her own comments to the court, Camperud did not indicate
that she felt her mental health issues had escalated, but rather focused on her need for
“med-management,” something she was apparently unable to obtain in the community.
(Tr., p.34, Ls.12-24.)
On appeal, Camperud claims that “the context of the instant offenses indicates
[her] pattern of escalating mental health issues has continued.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.78.) That Camperud’s mental health diagnosis changed once 2 when she between the
ages of 20 and 25, from Major Depressive Disorder to Bipolar I Disorder, does not
establish a pattern of “escalating mental health issues.” (PSI, pp.1, 466, 485, 278, 39496.) Nor does the context of the instant offenses – purportedly that she “was not on
[her] right meds,” “did not know how to cope” with changes in her life, and only “wrote
those checks for food” – indicate that Camperud’s mental health issues had escalated
since her last psychological evaluation. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8; PSI, pp.5, 16.) In
fact, Camperud told the presentence investigator that she chose to stop taking “all of
her medication” because she “no longer wanted to take them while pregnant.” (PSI,
p.13.) She acknowledged that her substance abuse exacerbates her mental health
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Camperud was apparently diagnosed with ADHD “as a child” and, although she was
diagnosed with Bulimia Nervosa in 2005, this was “in early full remission” as she
reported that she “started binging and purging as a teenager, but that she had “not done
so in several years.” (PSI, pp.394-96.) As such, these were not “new” mental health
issues with an onset between the years of 2000 and 2007.
5

issues, but told the court that she used methamphetamine to “get off” her (legal)
medication, and that that decision led her to commit the instant offenses “because [she]
was high, and [her] judgment was clouded.” (Tr., p.33, L.24 – p.34, L.5.) As such, it
would appear that the “context” of the instant offense was related more to Camperud’s
decision to use illegal substances in lieu of her legal prescription medications than it
was to any escalation of her mental health diagnoses.
Furthermore, to the extent that the “context” of the instant offenses includes
Camperud’s attempt to excuse her behavior by claiming that she only “wrote those
checks for food” because she “needed food and literaly [sic] only bought food. [She]
didn’t buy anything extra,” this claim is entirely disingenuous. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8;
PSI, p.5.)

According to the police reports, Camperud wrote more than 36 checks,

totaling at least $2,588.73, over a period of just 10 days. (PSI, p.36.) At least two of the
checks were written to D&B Supply, in the amounts of $492.51 and $266.38, for
merchandise that does not appear to include any food items, but rather were for
numerous clothing items, boots/shoes, knives, and tools. (PSI, pp.124, 126-27, 129.)
Camperud’s lack of candor with respect to the reasons she committed the instant
offenses does not indicate that her mental health diagnoses had changed.
In objecting to Camperud’s motion for a third continuance, the state argued:
Ms. Camperud seems to have a new reason why we need to continue the
sentencing every week. The state’s offer from the get-go has been for
imprisonment based on her extensive criminal history and, essentially,
committing the exact same offenses throughout. To the extent that she
could benefit from programming to address her mental-health needs, that
is all information that can be handled at RDU, and so I would object to
delaying these proceedings anymore. This is entirely Ms. Camperud’s
fault that these things haven’t been done.

6

(Tr., p.24, L.18 – p.25, L.3.) The district court acted within its discretion when it denied
Camperud’s third motion to continue the sentencing hearing, reasonably determining
that it had before it sufficient information with respect to Camperud’s mental health
issues. The court stated:
I’ve had an opportunity to review the presentence report, which
includes the previous presentence report. It does contain information
related to her mental health, and, quite frankly, those conditions are not
the types of conditions that somehow just go away even over the course
of time.
For this particular offense of issuing checks without funds, I
understand that mental health may be a significant factor or may be an
issue in considering any rehabilitative treatment that may be available,
and it is proper for the court to consider rehabilitation of the offender as
one of the factors it considers in fashioning a sentence.
However, for these particular crimes, it’s not a significant factor of
my sentencing that if she has retained the same mental-health conditions
that she’s had in the past, quite frankly, I just don’t see it either elevating
or reducing the court’s sentencing at this particular point, and I do find that
I have sufficient information.
While she was provided an opportunity to provide it, she did not in a
timely manner, and I don’t find it’s necessary at this point for me to have
any additional evaluation before I proceed to sentencing, so I’m not going
to allow additional time to now do those evaluations which have not been
done in the past.
(Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.23.)
At the time that she requested a third continuance of her sentencing hearing,
Camperud did not provide any information to indicate that her mental health diagnoses
had changed. With respect to the context of the instant offenses, Camperud’s crimes in
the instant case were very similar to many of her past crimes (fraud-no account check,
nonsufficient funds check, and forgery), which she also blamed on her inability to cope
with difficulties in her life and substance abuse. (PSI, pp.6, 271-72, 421-22, 461, 466.)
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Camperud

also

has

a

history of

failing

to

follow through

with

treatment

recommendations and/or requirements while in the community, and of instead choosing
to resume her abuse of illegal substances, which she knows exacerbates her mental
health issues. (PSI, pp.15, 278-81, 396-99, 412, 415, 419, 447, 463.) That Camperud
reverted to her old patterns of behavior, choosing to abuse illegal drugs rather than
seeking out community-based resources and subsequently blaming her criminal activity
on her substance abuse and falsely claiming that she only committed the crimes to
purchase food, is not a “context” that supports her claim that she has mental health
issues that have changed so much as to necessitate a new mental health evaluation.
The district court reasonably concluded that it had sufficient information to meet the
requirements of section I.C. § 19–2522(3), and that a third continuance of sentencing
was not warranted, particularly because Camperud herself did not find an updated
evaluation important enough either to appear for her appointment, or to reschedule her
missed appointment in a timely manner. Camperud has failed to establish that the
district court abused its discretion by denying her third request to continue her
sentencing hearing.
Camperud next asserts her sentences are excessive, in light of her substance
abuse, mental health issues, and purported remorse and acceptance of responsibility.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.) The record supports the sentences imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
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fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for felony issuing a check without funds is three
years. I.C. § 18-3106(a). The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of
three years, with one and one-half years fixed, which fall well within the statutory
guidelines. (R., pp.61-63.) At sentencing, the state addressed the serious and ongoing
nature of the offenses, Camperud’s repeated attempts to avoid accountability by
blaming others, her ongoing criminal offending, her history of failing to appear and
violating the terms of community supervision, her failure to rehabilitate or be deterred
despite numerous prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions, and the risk she
presents to society. (Tr., p.28, L.1 – p.29, L.22.) The state submits that Camperud has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached
excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendix A.)
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s decision to
deny Camperud’s third motion to continue her sentencing hearing and Camperud’s
convictions and sentences.

DATED this 5th day of February, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming_____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of February, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming
_________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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State v. Ryaru1 D. Cnmperud
1 RDU, and sol would obj eel to delaying these proceedings
2 anymore. This is entirely Ms. Camper11rl's fault that
3 these tl1ings haven't been done.
THR COTJRT: Mr. ::ltP.Veley, would you like to be
4
6 heard in response to that?
MR. STEVELEY: Judge, I'm convinced, having
G
7 spent considerable time on the phone and in person with
8 Ms. Camperud, that there are some substantial
9 mental-health issues, and J just don't think that going
10 forward on a sentencing where the state is asking for
11 imprisonment without the court being aware of what those
12 issues arc, would be · · would serve any purpose, and so
13 we arc asking for the continuance.
THE COURT: How Is this different than the
14
16 materials that have already been addressed in the
16 presentence reports, in the previous presentence
17 reports?
MR. STEVELEY: I agree that there are materials
18
19 within the contents of the presentence repurt that refer
20 to mental-health issues, but we don't have an update,
21 and I think it might be helpful to the cuurt lo have a
22 psych eval.
'fHE COURT: I've ha<l 1111 opportunity to review
23
24 the presentence repo1t, which includes the previous
25 presentence report. It does contain Information related
25
1
MR. VOGT: No, Yow· Honor.
THE COURT: Okny. Mr. Vogt, you can argue.
2
3
MR. VOGT: Thank you.
Pursuant to our plea agreement, Your Honor, I am
4
6 asking the court today to enter a judgment of
6 t.onvietion, 11nd, 11tarting with Count l, I'm asking the
7 con rt to Impose a 3-ycnr sentence with zero yca1'6 -8 well, 3 years·· excuse me·· a 3-year determinate, zero
9 years indetenninate. In Count 2, I'd ask you to run
10 this consecutive to Count 1 and to order a zero plus 3
11 in Count 3, a zero plus 3 to run consecutive to Counts 1
12 and 2, so for an aggregate of 3 plus 6 for 9. I'm
1~ asking the court to consider orderlng Ms. Camperud to
14 pay a fine and court costs, to order public defender
15 reimbursement, takinx iuto account Lhe multiple re.~ets
18 we've had in this case. I'm also seeking restitution In
17 this case in the amount of $3,638.55 to D & Il Supply,
18 Mave1ik and Jack.sons as separate victim~. [ have a
19 proposed order for COlUi and counsel.
MR. STEVELEY: Yow· Honor, I'm sorry. I missed
20
21 •• there it is. Got it. Thank you.
22
TH~ COURT: Is there any objection to the
23 request for victim restitution?
MR. STEVELEY: No, Your Honor.
24
26
MR. VOGT: Thank you.
27
Penny Ta,dilf. CS/1 #712 • (208) 287-7688
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1 to her mental health, and, quite frankly, U1ose

2 conditions arc not the types of conditions that somehow
just go away even over the course of time.
For this pruticular offense of Issuing checks
4
6 without funds, I understand that mental health may be a
6 significant factor or may be an issue in cunsi<lel'ing any
7 rehabilitative treatment that may be available, and it
8 Is proper for the court to consi<ler rehabilitation of
9 the offender as one of the factors It considers in
10 fashioning a sentence.
However, for these particular crimes, it's not a
11
12 significant factor of my sentencing that if she has
13 retained the sumc menlal-health C'JJ11ditions that 11he's
14 had in the past, quite frankly, I ju.,t don't see it
16 either elevating or reducing the court's sentencing at
16 this particular point, and I do find that I have
17 sufficient information.
While she was provided an opportunity to provide
18
19 it, she did not in a timely manner, and I don't find
20 it'i; necessary at this point for me to have any
21 acldltional evaluation before l proceed to sentencing, so
22 I'm not going to allow additional time to now do those
23 evaluations which huve not been done in the past.
Is there any victim-impact statement or
24
26 additional evidence or testimony, Mr. Vogt?
:l6
Along with the instant case, Ms. Camperud has
1
2 felony convictions for insufficient funds check from
3 2002, issuing checks without fwids in 2002. PCS with
4 intent In 2007, as well as a simple possession in 2007
5 and a forgery In 2007. There's been multiple probation
6 and parole violations on those felonies. She has a
7 number of misdemeanors as wdl. I won't go through the
8 laundry list of them but u doien or so misdemeanors as
9 well.
And, the facts of this case, really throughout
10
11 2014, Ms. Campcrud victimized her family nnd 10<'.nl
12 businesses, boU1by using her grandmother's Identity to
13 open charge accounts and by passing a large number of
14 checks from those accounts that belonged to her
16 ex-husband, or now ex-husbond, and this isn't really her
16 first rodeo. This is behavior that's repeated itself
17 over time, and she's been sanctioned repeatedly, and yet
18 she returns to the same criminal thinking and processes.
It's concerning that she also consistently plays
19
20 the victim In her crimes. It's always somebo<ly dse's
21 fault or she's entitled to these things. She's been
22 given the benefit of substuntial family support,
23 multiple treatment opportunities, in both the community
24 and the institution; yel, she continues to commit the
215 same crimes. Aud, from the state's view, it'1111ndo11hted
28
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THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Steveley.

MR. STEVELEY: Judge, in addition to the
appointment that she set up for mental-hea!Ui eval next
Tuesday with Ascent counseling, she ulso hus dasses
beginning with Ascent counseling starting next Friday.
She's also now secured a place to live. She's also
secured a financial soucce to begin as a student at a
Bible college. She's also begwi paying back restitution
at ~oo a month towards the $3,600 tltat she owes on this
case.
It's her position, Judge, that she committed
these crimes out of a feeling of desperation. In the
report, it's clear from her own self-analysis' view,
that she feels horrible about thls and is very
disappointed in herself. It's her position, Judge,
that, a!Uiough no stealing is right or good, that most
of the nmds that she stole or used, !think, the
Issuing checks without funds, were for food. She did
previously successfully complete a rider in 2002. She
previously successfully completed the therapeutic
community program in 2005,
She's very close with her father who is here
today and has been with her at all of her court dates,
She has also obtained GED. She has some job skJlls In
retrul as well as mobile communications. I believe she

she's taken over the years.
THE COURT: Okay. Aie those copies or
originals?
MR. STEVBLEY: These are originals, Judge.
THE COURT: Does the state have any objection to
me considering these?
MR. VOGT: I looked at Uiem briefly, Your Honor.
I don't object to the cou1t considering them. If the
court wants to make copies of it to append to the PSI, I
don't object to that either.
THE COURT: Okay. l'm not going to keep these.
I will review them.
MR. STEVELEY: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Many are related to the meth project
and other programs that she's completed. Some of these
I recognize from the certificate. It includes her time
that would have been setved in different institutional
settings.
MR. S'l'I.WELEY: That's correct, Judge.
THE COURT: I'll let the bailiff make a copy of
those before we return them to Ms. Camperud, and then
we'll append them to the PSI.
MR. STEVELEY: Thank you.

30
1 still has a job with Sprint, and once worked for them
2 for over five years.

29

1

Judge, I'd like to furnish the court with a

1

others.
She missed PSI appointments, failed to complete
the app1'0priate paperwork. Quite frankly, was dishonest
with the PSI auU1or about her work history. She was
deceptive with respect to her housing, and thls Is also
something that's consistent throughout the prior PSis.
While she claims she wants to provide for her
children, it's clear from the PSI, that she's not really
played an active role in the supporting or raising these
children, and, even by her own admission, she's
continued to use during the pcndency ofthis case.
She's failed to appear in the district courts, and,
quite frankly, from the PSI auUior's view, she appeared
high when she came to the PSI interview.
So, for all of those reasons, Your Honor, Ms.
Campemd is not II goo<l r.anclidate for community•hasecl
supervision. She's earned a prison sentence, given the
fact that she commits Uie same crime repeatedly, and,
quite frankly, ha.c: victimir,e a large numher of people,
so I'd ask the court to order the sentence I have laid
out. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mc. Steveley, would you like to be heard?
MR. STEVELEY: Yes. Thanks, Juc.lge.

She suffers from arthritis, MS and back pain.

3

4 She said she was diagnosed as bipolar back in 2007, and,
5 unfortunately, has had three attempted suicides. She
6

1
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1S
16
17

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

26

also suffers from PTSD, and, she indicates that during
the c.:0U1'1ie of her life, i;he had been raped, beaten and
pistol-whipped. She believes that she does need
mental-health counseling, and she's taken the steps to
go ahead and do that.
Her biggest substance-abuse issues are or have
been with prescription pain killers. She acknowledges
that her substance-abuse issues exacerbate her
mental-health issues anc.1 that's generally the ca.se in
most du11l diugnosis siluutions, w1d she does agre11 tit al
she needs additional treatment for those substance-abuse
issues as well.
She is interested and will at some point start
the process of enrolling in Dible college. She
acknowledges that she's very week in dealing with her
emotions and loss, and I think part of that goes to her
mental-health issues as well. She was a volunteer at
the mcth project for recovedng drug users and
previously did complete a parole.
As I pointed out earlier, Judge, I think that my
32

31
Pe11ny Tardiff. c;sR #712 • (208) 287-7588
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